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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 15, 1974

TO : S/P - Winston Lord
FROM : EA - Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. *AM*
SUBJECT: Random Notes on HAK-PRC Dinner April 14

The following is from my own notes, and without reference to the draft Memcon, which will have more accurate quotes.

(1) No Chinese mentioned Chou En-lai, or any of HAK's conversations with Chou. HAK mentioned Chou several times. Whenever the Chinese referred to past conversations or PRC policies they mentioned only Mao Tse-tung. COMMENT: The meaning of this is not clear to me; the mildest interpretation (and the one I favor) is that Chou himself, and others (maybe Teng and Chiao Kuan-hua), do not, at this time, want to have Chou's name and authority invoked in the Memcon reports to Peking, as the basis for US-China relations, and prefer to invoke Mao's greater authority instead.

(2) Chiao made a special point of saying (to paraphrase) "on the matter of normalization of relations, the essential meaning of the new phrase in the November Communique is that normalization can be done only on the basis of the Japanese pattern -- there is no other pattern that can replace it." COMMENT: This means complete de-recognition of Taiwan and severance of all but (nominally) private ties.

(3) Chiao observed at one point that "we should not step backward from the language of the Shanghai Communique". Teng said that possible next steps toward normalization "can be discussed" by HAK with Ambassador Huang Chen in Washington (apparently expressing a preference for this, over HAK's suggestion that it might wait until HAK's "next annual trip" to Peking). Teng said that we should see if the normalization process can be speeded up, but added that the PRC is not in any hurry.

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(4) Teng volunteered on his own initiative a flat statement that US-PRC relations are good, and nobody mentioned the two Taiwan remarks that Chiao had made to Bruce: the appointment of Len Unger and the new GRC Consulates in the US.

(5) Teng was quite reserved at first. (I have the impression he is naturally rather reticent). However he warmed up considerably during the evening, and was relaxed and pleasant toward the end.

(6) The translation job, by Ms. Chang Han-chih (Chiao's new wife) was not good at all. She is now a Deputy Director of the Office of Pakistan Affairs in MOFA in Peking, and may not get as much translating practice as she used to. A large number of expressions came through with slightly distorted flavor, and she missed a number of inferences that showed she had not fully understood the English. A number of us jumped in at different times to correct her -- Chas Freeman, myself, Mr. Kuo the note-taker for the PRC, (who showed considerable English ability) and Ambassador Huang Hua. She gratuitously added a crucial phrase at one point, and we are flagging it in the Memcon -- when Teng made one of his remarks that US-PRC relations are good, she added in the English version: "are good, so far". This was not in the Chinese, as stated by Teng.

(7) One of HAK's puckish remarks caused much mis-translation, confusion and consternation, with private appeals by the PRC translators for clarification, right up to their departure at the door. This was when both sides had stated agreement about courses of action in the Middle East, and HAK said (approximately): "If the time comes when we (PRC and US) disagree about the Middle East, it will mean I have succeeded (in settling the situation)".

(8) The PRC contingent was deliberately 10 minutes late. They gave notification to the Secret Service well in advance that they would not leave their Mission until five minutes before the hour, which automatically made them late.

(9) HAK said he would be seeing Ambassador Huang Chen in Washington "this week".

EA:AWHummel:fmk
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